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Frege’s Puzzle is a founding problem in analytic philosophy. It lies at the intersection of 
central topics in the philosophy of language and mind: the theory of reference, the nature of 
propositional attitudes, the nature of semantic theorizing, the relation between semantics and 
pragmatics, etc. 
The puzzle concerns the relation between the referential significance of a sentence (or 
utterance)—i.e., the way it portrays properties and relations as distributed over objects—and its 
cognitive significance. ‘Cognitive significance’ is an umbrella term, used to pick out a range of 
cognitively relevant features of a sentence: the state of mind a speaker could express with it, 
the kinds of evidence the speaker takes to be relevant to it, the states of mind in others she can 
use it to report, etc. Frege’s Puzzle seems to show that reference and cognitive significance 
don’t align in the way that independent considerations suggest they should. This chapter is an 
overview of the puzzle and of the space of contemporary approaches to it. 
 
1 Frege’s Challenge 
The background for discussions of cognitive significance is a puzzle introduced by (Frege, 
1892). Our interest is not historical, so I will present it in anachronistic form. It is generated by 
a tension between two plausible theses about meaning: one linking meaning with reference; 
another linking meaning with cognition. 
Millianism: The meaning of a proper name2 is its referent. 
Meaning and Cognitive Significance: The meaning of a sentence determines its 
cognitive significance. 
Millianism should be understood against the background of compositional theories of 
 
1 This chapter benefited from helpful feedback from the editors of this volume and from David Braun. 
2 For the sake of brevity, I’ll focus on proper names here. But analogous issues arise for other singular terms, and 
for expression of other semantic types. 
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meaning. In a compositional theory, the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the 
meaning of its parts, and their mode of combination. The meanings of simple expressions are 
assigned directly. It is natural, in a theory of this kind, to hold that the meaning of a proper 
name is the object to which it refers; that is, the meaning “London” is London (the city), the 
meaning of “Bob Dylan” is Bob Dylan (the man), etc. This is the simplest hypothesis about the 
meaning of a name that explains the contribution a name makes to the conditions under which 
a sentence containing it is true. 
Let’s call pairs of sentences that apparently differ only in the substitution of 
coreferential names ‘Frege-pairs’. Given Millianism, compositionality, and the assumption that 
there are no ‘hidden’ semantic differences between Frege-pairs, it follows that Frege-pairs 
have the same meaning. So it follows, given that Robert Zimmerman is Bob Dylan, that (1a) 
and (1b) have the same meaning. 
(1a) Bob Dylan is Bob Dylan 
(1b) Robert Zimmerman is Bob Dylan 
Frege claimed that pairs like (1a)/(1b) differ in cognitive significance. Identity 
statements of the form in (1a) are knowable a priori and analytic; while statements of the form 
in (1b) are not to be knowable a priori and contain “valuable extensions of our knowledge”. 
Frege took the difference in cognitive significance between (1a) and (1b) to entail that they 
differed in meaning. Here, he was relying on Meaning and Cognitive Significance.  
We can motivate Meaning and Cognitive Significance with simple reflection on the 
explanatory role of meaning. Meaning (or, perhaps, knowledge of meaning) bridges the gap 
between cognition and linguistic behaviour. Given I believe that p why did I assert sentence S? 
Because S means that p. Given I had evidence e, why did I assent to S? Because S means that p 
and e is relevant to the truth of p. And so forth. We’ll see shortly that this story is too crude. 
But it illustrates why Meaning and Cognitive Significance is a natural place to start our 
semantic theorizing. 
Frege also introduced a more direct challenge for Millianism. In sentences that report 
propositional attitudes, or speech acts—call these ‘ascriptions’ for short—substitution of 
coreferential names can, apparently, alter truth-values. Consider the following vignette. Smith 
knew Robert Zimmerman as a child. She is aware of the famous musician Bob Dylan, but is 
unaware that the boy she knew as a child is Dylan. As far as she knows, the boy she grew up 
with went on to lead an unmusical life. In relation to this situation, speakers judge (2a) to be 
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true but (2b) to be false. 
(2a) Smith believes that Bob Dylan is a musician 
(2b) Smith believes that Robert Zimmerman is a musician 
If we accept these judgments, we have a more direct problem for Millianism. Relying 
only on the assumption that truth-conditions are compositional and that (utterances of) (2a) and 
(2b) semantically differ only in the substitution of coreferential names, we predict that (2a) and 
(2b) must have the same truth-value. 
 
2 Sense and ‘The New Theory of Reference’ 
Frege responded to these considerations by rejecting Millianism. He held that singular terms 
had two kinds of linguistic significance: sense and reference. The sense of an expression, for 
Frege, was the way that the expression ‘presented’ its referent. The sense of an expression, for 
Frege, determines its reference. But two expressions with the same reference could ‘present’ it 
in different ways; so coreferential names could differ in sense. 
He proposed to explain differences in cognitive significance between Frege-pairs with 
differences in sense, and so developed a theory of the role that sense played in linguistic 
understanding and semantics. Speakers understand an expression by being in cognitive contact 
with its sense (by ‘grasping’ it). Reference is the level at which compositional determination of 
truth-conditions occurs. The sense of an expression determines its cognitive significance. The 
contrast between (1a) and (1b) shows that ‘Bob Dylan’ and ‘Robert Zimmerman’ have 
different senses. 
Frege held that ascriptions generate a ‘shift’ in meaning: when it is embedded under an 
attitude verb, an expression refers to its ‘customary’ sense (i.e. the sense it has when not so-
embedded). This allows Frege to capture the differences in truth conditions between (2a) and 
(2b). As they occur in those sentences, ‘Bob Dylan’ and ‘Robert Zimmerman’ have different 
referents (because they have different senses when they occur unembedded). So Frege can hold 
that (2a) and (2b) are not, contrary to appearances, related by substitution of coreferential 
expressions; so he can explain their difference in truth-conditions without violating 
compositionality. 
This framework is elegant. But its plausibility depends, inter alia, on giving an account 
of sense. Frege didn’t offer an account. When he characterizes the sense of an expression, he 
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tends to reach for descriptions. For example, the sense of ‘Aristotle’, for some speakers, might 
be the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. These remarks suggest a theory that 
formed the background to 20th century work in the theory of reference: the sense of a name, n, 
for a speaker, S, is a description, d, that S associates with n; n refers to whatever satisfies d. Call 
this Descriptivism.3 
Space does not allow us to recapitulate the arguments against Descriptivism.4 Suffice it 
to say that seminal work in the 1960s and 1970s—by Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, 
Burge, and others—was taken by many to decisively refute it. In brief, the claim that linguistic 
reference is always mediated by descriptive identification of an object was taken to be 
implausible as an account of linguistic competence and to make false predictions about the 
epistemic and modal features of sentences involving names (Kripke, 1980). In its place, the 
‘new’ theory of reference held that reference is typically determined, in part, by factors that are 
‘external’ to a speaker’s cognition—for example, the chain of uses of a term that links a 
speaker’s use back to an original baptism.5 
The work of the ‘new theorists’ is taken not just to refute Descriptivism, but to motivate 
Millianism. Though non-Millians remain6, Millianism forms the background for most 
contemporary discussions of cognitive significance. The ‘new theory’ is also taken to weaken, 
or complicate, our commitment to Meaning as Cognitive Significance. We motivated it above 
by reflecting on the explanatory role of meaning: grasp of meaning is the bridge between 
cognition and language-use. But the externalism embodied in the new theory—the idea that the 
meaning of a term for a speaker depends on facts that are external to the speaker’s 
psychology—complicates this explanatory picture. Given externalism, it is possible for a 
speaker to be unaware that two expressions mean the same thing (because she is unaware, for 
example, that the chain of uses leading from her use of ‘Dylan’ and the one leading from her 
use of ‘Zimmerman’ converge on the same man). In the context of the new theory, difference 
in cognitive significance does not entail difference in meaning. A significant literature has 
developed around the issue of the extent to which externalism about meaning entails that 




3 For discussion see (McLeod & Dunbar, n.d.) 
4 See (Nelson, n.d.) 
5 For an overview, see (Soames, n.d.) 
6 See (Chalmers, 2002) and (Jackson, n.d.), (Schoubye, n.d.), and (Sawyer, n.d.) for different departures from 
Millianism. 
7 See (Boghossian, 1992) for a classic discussion. 
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3 Clarifying the Challenge(s) 
Frege’s Puzzle appears to offer two distinct, but related, challenges: to explain the difference in 
cognitive significance between Frege-paired ‘simple sentences’; and to explain the apparent 
differences in truth-conditions of Frege-paired ascriptions. In this section, we examine the 
challenges in more detail. 
3.1 Simple Sentences 
What, exactly, does Frege challenge us to explain? We introduced the challenge in relation to 
true identity statements, but it is broader. A competent, rational, speaker who doesn’t know 
that Dylan is Zimmerman, might accept (3a) while rejecting (3b). 
(3a) Dylan is a musician 
(3b) Zimmerman is a musician 
Identity statements dramatically illustrate a more general point: Frege-paired 
declarative sentences can differ in the evidence that competent, rational, speakers would 
require to endorse them. And given the kind of connection between meaning and cognition that 
Frege is assuming, this poses a perfectly general problem.  
Even if we reject Meaning and Cognitive Significance—as new theorists might—we 
are still left with a question: what is the difference between Frege-pairs? How should we 
explain the different way they interact with linguistic cognition and communication? 
It is not uncommon to find discussions of Frege’s challenge framed in terms of the 
problem of explaining why a competent, rational, speaker might assent to, or accept, an 
utterance of a declarative sentence S while failing to assent to, or accept, an utterance of a Sʹ, 
when S and Sʹ are Frege-pairs. But the challenge is broader than this in several ways. 
First, it shows up with non-declarative sentences. Consider (4a)/(4b). 
(4a) Is Dylan a musician? 
(4b) Is Zimmerman a musician? 
These pairs exhibit an analogous contrast to that exhibited by (3a)/(3b), modulo the 
communicative role of interrogative sentences. A speaker who is unaware that Dylan is 
Zimmerman could respond differently to each pair in a way that is functionally analogous the 
difference between acceptance/rejection in the case of declarative sentences. Such a speaker 
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might treat (4b) but not (4a) as an attempt to change the subject (if the conversation had been 
about Dylan), or might treat (4a) but not (4b) as an attempt to reopen a question that had 
already been settled (if it was common ground in the conversation that Dylan was a musician). 
Analogous points could be made with respect to other non-assertoric speech acts. 
There are also challenges associated with speakers who are aware of the relevant 
identities. Suppose Brown believes that Zimmerman is Dylan but is unaware he is a 
Minnesotan; contrast the effects on Brown of accepting the discourses in (5a)/(5b). 
(5a) Dylan is a Minnesotan. But Dylan is not Zimmerman. 
(5b) Zimmerman is a Minnesotan. But Dylan is not Zimmerman. 
Notice two things. First, Brown would be in a different attitude states as a result of 
accepting (5a) as compared to accepting (5b): just consider how she would respond to the 
question, “Is Zimmerman a Minnesotan?”, after accepting each discourse. So the two 
discourses, as a whole, must differ in cognitive significance for her. But notice, also, that the 
second sentence of each discourse is the same. So if the two discourses differ in cognitive 
significance for Brown, it must be because the first uttered sentences differ in cognitive 
significance for her (or, equally puzzling, that the cognitive significance of a discourse is not 
determined by the cognitive significance of its component utterances). Recall, though, when 
the first sentence is uttered, Brown believes that Dylan is Zimmerman. This suggests that 
Frege-pairs can have different cognitive effects on speakers who believe that they are 
referentially equivalent. 
Theorists sometimes appeal directly to speakers’ judgments about sameness/difference 
of meaning. We might simply ask speakers whether Frege-pairs have the same meaning. Many 
theorists hold that untutored intuitions tell us that the pairs have different meanings. Perhaps 
this, itself, requires explanation. Similarly, Frege-pairs appear to participate differently in 
intuitive evaluation of inferences. 
There are a few upshots to this. The first is that there appear to be a whole range of 
phenomena which are such that we are inclined, in explaining them, to appeal to the meaning 
of sentences or utterance, and such that Frege-pairs participate differently in them (no doubt 
the list above could be extended). There is no simple, precise, statement of what it is for two 
sentences to differ in cognitive significance. So it’s not obvious how much uniformity there is 
in ‘the’ challenge posed by Frege’s puzzle. 
This has two important lessons for us. First, without a precise, pre-theoretical, 
characterization of cognitive significance, we can’t put much weight on Meaning and 
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Cognitive Significance. That the meaning of a sentence plays some, yet to be precisely 
characterized, role in each of the above phenomenon is little reason to be troubled by the fact 
that sentences with the same meaning might play different roles. More interestingly, perhaps, 
the variety also suggests that we shouldn’t be too quick to assume that what is required is a 
unitary explanation. The literature is replete with apparently competing responses to Frege’s 
challenge. It would be salutary to keep in mind that apparently competing strategies might be 
complementary—either by applying to different aspects of Frege’s challenge, or by working 
together in relation to explain some aspects. 
 
3.2 Attitude Ascriptions 
Frege claimed that sentences like (2a) [“Smith believes that Bob Dylan is a musician”] and 
(2b)[“Smith believes that Robert Zimmerman is a musician”] can differ in truth-value. The 
source of this claim is simply that there are circumstances in which competent speakers, even 
those who know that Dylan is Zimmerman, would accept (2a) while rejecting (2b) (and would 
even do so by calling one “true” and the other “false”). Contemporary theorists are cautious 
about moving directly from speakers’ judgments about the truth-values of utterances to claims 
about the truth-values of the uttered sentences. Put roughly, we now assume that speakers have 
generally reliable judgments, at most, about, what we might call, ‘the conveyed content’ of an 
utterance. Conveyed content is not always identical to the semantic content of the uttered 
sentence. It often includes substantial influence of various kinds of pragmatic processes. 
So we should be careful about how we describe the data. Instead of saying that the 
relevant pairs differ in truth-value, we’ll say that they differ in ‘acceptability’. 
‘Acceptable’/‘Unacceptable’ are technical terms, used to characterize speaker’s intuitive 
evaluations of uttered sentences in a way that doesn’t presuppose that speakers are making 
accurate judgments about the uttered sentence’s truth-value. We’ll see below that some 
accounts of ascriptions insist that if we focus on the semantic properties of the uttered 
sentence, (2b) is true. When speakers reject it as unacceptable, the thought goes, they are 
responding to some feature of its conveyed content distinct from the semantic value of the 
uttered sentence. 
This redescription allows us to characterize a choice-point in approaches to Frege’s 
challenge: should we give the same response to both aspects of the challenge? That is, do the 
same explanatory mechanisms explain the data about simple sentences and attitude 
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ascriptions? Frege-paired simple sentences cannot differ in truth-value.8 This is why we had to 
gesture at the difficult-to-characterize idea of differences in cognitive significance. If we say 
the same thing about Frege-paired ascriptions—if we say that the relevant sentences cannot 
differ in truth-value—it is open to us to offer the same explanation of the perceived differences 
in meaning that we offer in the case of simple sentences. 
This is an important choice point. Some theorists approach the challenge in a hybrid 
way, positing a semantic difference between pairs of ascriptions while positing some other 
kind of difference between pairs of simple sentences. Others argue that a unified approach is 
possible, and preferable on the grounds of simplicity. 
It’s worth pausing to discuss features of the data that are relevant to the prospects of a 
unified approach. Let’s extend our vignette from above. Suppose Smith is friends with Jones. 
Jones and Smith are in the same situation with respect to Dylan/Zimmerman. Jones would 
accept (1a) but not accept (1b); she would also accept (2a) but not accept (2b). So far, so good. 
But suppose that Jones, but not Smith, learns that Zimmerman is Dylan. Jones will now accept 
both (1a) and (1b). But it’s natural to think that so long as she thinks that Smith is still not in 
the know about Dylan’s identity, and that Smith would still avow the same beliefs, Jones 
would continue to accept (2a) and not accept (2b). 
It doesn’t seem that learning that Dylan is Zimmerman puts any pressure on Jones to 
revise her judgments about (2a) and (2b). This, presumably, is at the heart of Frege’s insistence 
that unlike simple sentences, the truth-values of ascriptions can be altered by substitution of 
coreferential names. The differences in acceptability for ascriptions persist even when 
audiences (but not attributees) are ‘in the know’ about the relevant identities.  
There are two related things to highlight. The first is just that speakers are especially 
resistant to treating reports like (2b) as true (in scenarios of the kind just imagined). In many, 
though perhaps not all, cases in which the conveyed content of an utterance exceeds the 
semantic content of an uttered sentence, ordinary speakers can be brought to distinguish 
between the two, and so can be brought to acknowledge, for example, that the semantic content 
is true when conveyed content is false. It isn’t clear that this is the case with (2b). Even 
philosophers—well-practiced in isolating semantic and pragmatic content—often claim to be 
unable to detect the putative truth semantically expressed by it. On the other hand, some 
theorists claim that ordinary speakers, perhaps with a little philosophical tutelage, can be 
 
8 I’m glossing over some subtleties here. Most importantly, there are constructions which don’t appear to take 
sentential complements, yet appear to display the same behaviour as ascriptions, for example ‘intensional transitive 
verbs’. 
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brought to see that (2a) and (2b) have the same semantic content.9 
Second, whatever we say about that, there is still the initial contrast: once you’re in the 
know, you don’t treat (1a) and (1b) as differing in acceptability; but you do continue to treat 
(2a) and (2b) as differing in acceptability (at least until you receive philosophical therapy). 
And this, itself, is an aspect of the data. The uniformity we posit in our account of simple 
sentences and ascriptions cannot be so complete as to leave us unable to explain why 
differences in acceptability are substantially more robust with ascriptions. 
It’s important to note, though, that it isn’t clear that contrasts in acceptability for simple 
sentences always disappear for those in the know. Contrast (6a) and (6b) (imagine them in the 
context of a biography). 
(6a) Zimmerman left Minnesota but Dylan arrived in New York. 
(6b) Dylan left Minnesota but Zimmerman arrived in New York. 
Even if one is in the know, it’s quite natural to judge (6a) as acceptable and (6b) as 
unacceptable. Examples of this sort provide some support for a unified approach to simple 
sentences and ascriptions because they call into question the sharp cleavage in the data we 
claimed to find.10 How much support they provide will depend on the extent to which the 
explanation of the difference in acceptability between examples like this can be extended to 
ascriptions (consider: How much does the contrast between (6a) and (6b) depend on the 
narrative situation? How much does it depend on contrastive structure? How much does it 
depend on the fact that the speaker has chosen to use a second name rather than an anaphoric 
pronoun?). 
Finally, we should keep in mind that there is context-sensitivity in the acceptability of 
ascriptions.11 Consider Kripke’s (1979) example: Pierre grew up in Paris, hearing about the 
beautiful English capital; so he would sincerely assert “Londres est jolie”. Having been 
transported to London at a later time, learning English there, failing to realize that the city he 
now lives is the one he calls ‘Londres’, and finding it distasteful, he would sincerely assert 
“London is not pretty”. Consider (7). 
(7) Pierre thinks that London is pretty. 
 
 
9 1This claim is commonly made by Millians. One influential version of it motivates acceptance of the initially 
doubtful ascription by showing how it follows from other, intuitively acceptable, principles. An influential version 
of this idea can be found in (Richard, 1983). 
10 This kind of example is introduced in (Saul, 1997) and explored in (Braun & Saul, 2002; Saul, 2010). 
11 See (Richard, n.d.) for an overview. 
10  
 
If we imagine it uttered in the context of a discussion of Pierre’s beliefs about the relative 
attractiveness of capitals (“Pierre thinks that Paris is pretty, that Madrid is not pretty, that 
London is pretty...”), it appears acceptable. If we imagine it uttered in the context of a 
discussion of Pierre’s views about his current living situation (“Pierre loves living in London. 
He has a great job, he thinks that London is pretty”), it appears unacceptable. Part of answering 
Frege’s challenge is explaining this context-sensitivity. 
 
4 A Taxonomy of Approaches 
The literature on Frege’s Puzzle is voluminous and the variety of approaches is bewildering. In 
this section, I’ll provide an (admittedly incomplete) taxonomy. 
Consider the components of a linguistic exchange. On one side, we have a speaker’s 
cognitive situation: their attitudes, representations of the speech situation, their communicative 
intentions, and their knowledge of their language. On the basis of that, the speaker utters a 
sentence with certain semantic features (relative to the context of utterance). Those features, in 
conjunction with facts about the communicative situation, determine the conveyed content of 
the utterance. On the basis of those things, the utterance has an effect on the cognitive state of 
the audience (principally on their attitudes). 
We can understand the space of responses to Frege’s challenge by starting from a set of 
‘default’ assumptions about these components. We can think of the defaults as claims that 
theorists in this area ‘get for free’. This is not to say that they are uncontroversial or true. It’s 
only to say they are typically taken as an acceptable ground-zero for theorizing about cognitive 
significance. Additions or modifications to them are justified by their role in responding to the 
challenge. The defaults are: 
 
i) Propositional content is Russellian. That is, propositions are complexes of objects, 
properties, and operators and they have a sentence-like structure.12 So Russellian 
propositions are the contents of attitudes, uttered sentences, and communicative acts. 
ii) The attitude state of a speaker can be modeled as a collection of relations to Russellian 
propositions (i.e. a set of propositions believed, a set of propositions desired, etc). 
 
12 See, e.g., (Salmon, 1986), (Soames, 1987a), (King, 2007). This is a controversial component of the default. Many 
philosophers of language and mind hold that propositional content does not have sentence- like structure. 
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iii) Meaning is Millian and compositional. The semantic contribution of an uttered name n 
in sentence S is the object n introduces into (the relevant part of) the proposition expressed 
by S. So Frege-pairs semantically express the same proposition. 
iv) In an attitude ascription ⌜X v’s that p⌝, v expresses a relation between individuals and 
propositions. The ascription is true iff the individual denoted by X stands in the relation 
denoted by v to the proposition denoted by p. 
v) No pragmatic effects—assertoric enrichment, conversational implicature, pragmatic 
modulation, etc—are relevant to Frege’s challenge. 
 
Jointly, these assumptions set the background for Frege’s challenge. They assume that 
sentences that appear only to differ in the substitution of coreferential names, really do only 
differ in that way. So Frege-pairs have the same semantic value. And they assume that there 
are no post-semantic mechanisms at play to generate different conveyed contents. And they 
offer no hint of how Frege-pairs might differ in relation to cognition. We can understand 
approaches to cognitive significance in terms of which of these assumptions they reject and 
how. Keep in mind that particular theories will often depart from more than one assumption. 
 
4.2 Pragmatic Departures 
Perhaps the simplest, and probably the most popular, approach is to depart from (v). We can 
keep everything else in place and simply hold that Frege-pairs, though they don’t differ in their 
semantic content, can nevertheless differ in conveyed content.13 The challenge for approaches 
of this kind is to specify the way in which the conveyed content diverges from the semantic 
content and to offer a non ad hoc account of the pragmatic mechanism that brings that 
divergence about.14 
If this approach does not diverge from (i), it must locate the difference between 
semantic content and conveyed content in Russellian terms. This is done by positing 
descriptively-enriched Russellian propositions as conveyed content. So, given the appropriate 
context, the conveyed content of an utterance of (3a)[“Dylan is a musician”] might include the 
proposition that Dylan, the famous sixties folk icon, is a musician, while the conveyed content 
 
13 There is also a possibility of claiming that utterances of Frege-pairs don’t convey different contents, 
but they differ pragmatically in some other way; perhaps there are different pragmatic conditions on their 
appropriate utterance. Soames sometimes talks this way—see (Soames, 1987b). 
14 For overviews see (Saul, 1998) and (Nelson, 2019, section 5). For criticisms of Berg’s implicature approach, see 
(Davis, 2017). 
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of an utterance of (3b)[“Robert Zimmerman is a musician”] might include the proposition that 
Zimmerman, the son of Abram Zimmerman from Duluth, is a musician. Given that these are 
distinct Russellian propositions, the conveyed content of the two utterances will be distinct. 
And the difference in cognitive significance between the two utterances will be explained in 
terms of differences in conveyed content. 
It isn’t clear that this approach can explain the cognitive difference in the sort of cases 
on which the debate usually focuses.15 Nor is it clear that accounts of this form will explain the 
full range of facts about cognitive significance canvassed in section (3.1). (Note: I don’t mean 
to suggest that it is clear that this approach won’t work either). 
There are different conceptions of the mechanisms that generate the conveyed content. 
We could hold that it is conversationally implicated16 or that it is asserted.17 In either case, the 
challenge is to show that the enrichments are independently motivated by our general theories 
of implicature and assertion, and not simply stipulated as convenient solutions to Frege’s 
challenge. 
A variant of this approach holds that utterances always express multiple layers of 
Russellian content, related according to general principles of information-theory18. And that 
differences in the way that semantic content is expressed—for example, the difference between 
using “Zimmerman” or “Dylan”—will generate different propositions at ‘token- reflexive’ 
levels of conveyed content (roughly: levels of conveyed content that are about how the 
semantic content of an utterance is determined). 
The most committed pragmatic theorist will offer the same explanation of simple 
sentences and ascriptions. As with simple sentences, we can hold that the extra content in 
ascriptions is asserted or that it is implicated. There are different approaches with respect to the 
nature of the extra content. Some theorists treat it as adding extra specification of the content of 
ascribee’s first-order attitudes (Soames, 2002); (for example, the conveyed content of an 
utterance of (2a) might contain the proposition that Smith believes that Dylan, the famous 
sixties folk icon, is a musician). Others treat the extra content as characterizing the ascribee’s 
cognitive state in terms of linguistic behaviour or attitudes about language (for example, the 
conveyed content of (2 a) might contain the proposition that Smith would assent to the 
 
15 See (Sider & Braun, 2006), (Caplan, 2007), and (Speaks, 2011). 
16 See (Richard, 1986), (Soames, 1987b,a), (Salmon, 1986, 1989), (Berg, 1988), (Saul, 1997, 1998). Sometimes 
these theorists speak generally about ‘conveyed content’ without specifying whether this is implicature or some 
other (unspecified) pragmatic mechanism. 
17 (Soames, 2002) 
18 (Perry, 2001), (Korta & Perry, 2011). 
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sentence “Dylan is a musician”, or that Smith believes that this sentence is true.).19 Still others 
characterize it in terms of psychological posits like ‘guises’ (Saul, 1998). It isn’t clear that any 
non ad-hoc pragmatic story will provide satisfying explanations here. It is worth noting, 
though, that if one can be developed in a non ad hoc way, it would likely explain the context-
sensitivity of ascriptions. 
 
4.2 Propositional Departures 
Some theorists hold that responding to Frege’s challenge requires abandoning (i); that is, 
revising our account of propositions. Consider two subjects, each ignorant that Dylan is 
Zimmerman. Xavier believes (as we would naturally describe it) that Dylan is a musician and 
that Zimmerman is from Minnesota. Wyatt believes that Dylan is a musician and that Dylan is 
from Minnesota. Given the default assumptions, we have no way to distinguish the two attitude 
states: each believes the same Russellian propositions. This seems like a bad consequence; 
there are cognitive differences between the subjects that are relevant to their linguistic 
behaviour (and their behaviour more generally). We might, then, develop a more fine-grained 
conception of propositions: one that distinguishes the propositional objects of the belief that 
Dylan is a musician and the belief that Zimmerman is a musician. This was an aspect of 
Frege’s response: he held that the objects of the attitudes are thoughts—that is, abstract objects 
composed of senses (Frege, 1918). The new theory of reference discouraged theorists from 
adopting a descriptivist version of Frege’s theory, but there are non-descriptive approaches to 
sense. 
One tradition holds that given a proper understanding of semantic theorizing, 
differences in sense will be easy to capture. Suppose that a semantic theory takes the form of a 
collection of sentences assigning meanings to lexical items, and rules that generate the 
meanings of complex expressions compositionally. In that context, the clause that specifies the 
meanings of “Bob Dylan” might be (8a) while the clause that specifies the meaning of “Robert 
Zimmerman” might be (8b). 
(8a) “Bob Dylan” refers to Bob Dylan 
(8b) “Robert Zimmerman” refers to Robert Zimmerman 
These are distinct sentences in our theory of meaning, so it’s open to us to hold that 
 
19 See (Salmon, 1986, pg. 117) (Soames, 1987a) (Berg, 1988, n.d.). 
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they represent “Bob Dylan” and “Robert Zimmerman” as having different meanings (thus 
rejecting (iii )).20 This difference ramifies through the compositional rules and generates 
different meanings for sentences containing the names. So the theory assigns different 
meanings to Frege-pairs. So we can locate the difference in cognitive significance between 
Frege-pairs at the level of content. 
This kind of approach has some appeal; it inherits the elegance of Frege’s approach in 
that it offers a unified and simple response to the challenges. But it is often held to be 
unsatisfying. Note that the theory specifies the difference in meaning between “Bob Dylan” 
and “Robert Zimmerman” by using those expressions in the metalanguage. It thus provides no 
independent grip on that difference (something we might have hoped that our theory would 
provide). Proponents of the view insist that this demand is misplaced. They hold that (8a), for 
example, displays the sense of “Bob Dylan” even if it doesn’t describe it (because all it does is 
assign a referent to the name). Whether this sort of response is satisfactory will depend 
substantially on what one thinks we are entitled to expect from a theory of meaning. Suffice it 
to say for our purposes that many theorists want more. There are forms of non-descriptive 
Fregeanism that offer substantive theories of sense; we will postpone discussion of those until 
the next section. 
There are other fine-grained conceptions of propositions. Insofar as the problem non- 
descriptive Fregeanism is the difficulty in giving a clear account of sense, we might be tempted 
to develop a conception of propositions that invokes entities we have a clearer antecedent grip 
on. An approach of this kind holds that linguistic expressions are, themselves, components (or, 
at least, ground the individuation) of propositions.21 We can start from Russellian 
propositions—which, recall, are complexes of worldly entities—and construct linguistically-
enhanced propositions by replacing every occurrence of a wordly entity with a pair comprising 
that entity and a linguistic expression that denotes it. So for example, whenever we find Dylan 
in a proposition, we will replace him with the pair <“Bob Dylan”, Dylan> or the pair <“Robert 
Zimmerman”, Dylan> (or some other pair involving a different expression that denotes Dylan). 
In this way we retain the basic structure of Russellian propositions, but individuate proposition 
more finely by including linguistic expressions as propositional constituents. (This is an 
oversimplification, but will do for our purposes). 
This approach can distinguish the object of the belief that Dylan is a musician from the 
 
20 This idea is most closely associated with Davidsonian approaches to semantics (see especially (Mc- Dowell, 
1977). But it finds its way into model theoretic semantics approached too. See discussion in (Yalcin, 2018). 
21 See (Harman, 1972), (Higginbotham, 1991), (Segal, 1989), (Larson & Ludlow, 1993). 
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object of the belief that Zimmerman is a musician. One proposition contains the name “Dylan” 
while the other contains the name “Zimmerman”. It appears to have other virtues: it offers an 
account of propositions that is finer-grained than Russellianism, but also provides clear 
individuation conditions. It is also possible to supply a compositional theory that associates 
linguistically-enhanced propositions with sentences. And it fits with a plausible background 
ideology that holds propositional thought is linguistically mediated (whether by public 
language or the language of thought). 
A worry about the approach is that it individuates propositions too finely; it entails, for 
example, that no sentences in distinct languages can express the same proposition.22 The extent 
of the issue here depends on how this account of propositions interacts with a semantics for 
ascriptions, so we will postpone discussion of it. 
Finally, we can mention relationist approaches to propositional content. Recall our 
initial problem in this section: how to distinguish Xavier and Wyatt’s attitude state. The options 
we have explored so far have proposed adding additional objects into propositional content—
either senses or linguistic expressions. An alternative adds additional relational structure into 
propositions. The crucial difference, it seems, between Xavier and Wyatt is that Wyatt’s attitude 
state encodes that the person who is represented to be a musician and the person who is 
represented to be from Minnesota, are the same person. Other fine-grained accounts of 
propositions understand this encoding of sameness as the re-occurrence of propositional 
constituents. We could, instead, posit relations between propositional constituents. This is 
Semantic Relationism.23 It identifies the content of an attitude state with a collection of 
Russellian propositions along with a coordination relation on those propositions. The 
coordination relation captures which propositional constituents are encoded as identical. 
Semantic Relationism is a fine-graining of propositional content that avoids awkward 
questions about the individuation of propositional constituents. It achieves this by replacing 
propositional constituents with relations. This benefit has a potential down-side, though. It 
involves a significant departure from traditional approaches to compositionality and the 
aggregation of attitude states; the semantic contribution of a representation cannot be 
‘localized’ to its immediate syntactic environment, because it might introduce semantically 
relevant relations to syntactically distant expressions.24 
 
22 Worries of this kind go back to Church’s (1950) discussion of (Carnap, 1947). 
23 See (Taschek, 1995, 1998), (Fine, 2007, 2010b), (Pinillos, 2011, 2015), (Gray, 2017). For related views, see 
(Heck, 2012) and (Pryor, 2016). 
24 See (Fine, 2007, 2010a). For further discussion see (Pickel & Rabern, 2016, 2017). 
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4.3 Cognitive Departures 
We just considered attempts to distinguish Xavier’s and Wyatt’s attitude state in terms of 
content. Other approaches agree that we need to distinguish those states, but deny that they 
need to be distinguished in terms of content. These approaches respond to Frege’s challenge by 
complicating our theory of the nature of attitude states without complicating our theory of their 
content (so rejecting (ii) but not (i)). 
The most standard version of this approach is to hold that a two-place attitude 
relation—X v’s that p—holding between a subject and a proposition is grounded in a three-
place relation. The three-place relation holds between a subject, a proposition, and some third 
term—options here include an expression in the language of thought, a character, a guise, a 
notion, a way of believing, etc.25 These are different proposals about features of the 
psychological state of a subject that partially ground the intentional features of their attitudes. 
The idea, for example, is that although Xavier’s belief that Dylan is from Minnesota and her 
belief that Zimmerman is from Minnesota relate Xavier to the same proposition, they differ in 
their third term. She is belief-related to the same proposition ‘twice-over’ in virtue of tokening 
different internal mental ‘symbols’. 
It is important to recognize that this claim is not, in the first instance, a claim about the 
semantics of ascriptions; it is not, for example, the claim that ‘believe’ semantically expresses 
a three-place relation. Rather, it is a claim about the metaphysics of the attitudes. So without 
other additional hypothesis, it makes no new predictions about the semantics of attitude 
ascriptions. We will see below that some theorists incorporate this extra cognitive structure 
into the semantics of ascriptions. But some, like Salmon (1986), do not. He opts, instead, to 
mix this picture of the attitudes with a pragmatic account of the difference in cognitive 
significance between Frege-paired ascriptions. 
Because accounts like this do not locate these differences at the level of content, they 
owe us some explanation of why differences in the ‘third term’ generate differences in 
cognitive significance. In the case of simple sentences, this is typically done by gesturing at the 
way that the third terms affect a subject’s linguistic behaviour: Salmon (1986) suggests that 
they have an effect on one’s ability to ‘recognize’ propositions when they are encountered; 
 
25 For ‘expression in the language of thought’ see (Fodor, 1975, 1990); for ‘character’ see (Kaplan, 1989); for 
‘guise’ see (Salmon, 1986, 1989); for ‘notion’ see (Crimmins & Perry, 1989; Perry, 2001; Crimmins, 1992); for 
‘way of believing’ see (Braun, 1998). The list could be extended. 
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Braun (1998) talks about their effect on dispositions to accept sentences, Fodor (1975) 
characterizes names in the language of thought in terms of their causal/functional roles. These 
are, presumably, promissory notes awaiting the redemption of some future psychological 
theory. The central point here is that these approaches typically reject Meaning and Cognitive 
Significance. They hold that the cognitive differences between Frege-pairs, at least for simple 
sentences, has no reflection at the level of meaning. It is psychological but not semantic. The 
cognitive difference between Frege-pairs boils down to the different way that they interface 
with a speaker’s idiosyncratic psychology. 
A distinct class of approaches offers a relational account of the nature of the attitudes. 
They see attitudes as bundled into dossiers, files, webs, etc.26 Attitudes that are bundled in this 
way—that are part of the same file or web, etc—are claimed to stand in important functional 
relations. In particular, they are functionally related so that the subject can ‘trade on the 
identity’ of their referents (in the sense of (Campbell, 1987)). This means that the subject is 
disposed to deploy those attitudes in reasoning and action in a way that presupposes that they 
are about the same thing and does so without the presence of a representation of their identity. 
With this sort of functional organization in our theoretical repertoire, we can distinguish 
Xavier’s and Wyatt’s attitude-states. In Wyatt’s case, the two attitudes are bundled together. In 
Xavier’s case they are not. In effect, bundling takes the place of the Fregean notion of 
sameness-of-sense. These functional differences will have a downstream effect on how Xavier 
and Wyatt are disposed to deploy their attitudes. The hope is that this will provide an 
explanation of range of phenomena we canvassed above. Consider, for example, the 
phenomenon exhibited by (5a)/(5b). If we hold the Zimmerman-bundle and the Dylan-bundle 
can be distinct even when a subject believes that Dylan is Zimmerman (in file-speak, if the 
files are linked but not merged), we could explain the cognitive difference between the two 
utterances. The first sentence in (5a) adds a belief to the Dylan-bundle; the first sentence in 
(5b) adds a belief to the Zimmerman-bundle. 
The relation between the bundle approach and Fregeanism is somewhat delicate. 
Certain versions of it conceive of themselves as a kind of neo-Fregeanism.27 They conceive of 
mental files as senses and assign to them many of the semantic roles that Frege assigned to 
sense. From one perspective, then, we could think of these theories as offering a substantive 
account of non-descriptive senses (and so, attempting to respond to the worry that non-
 
26 (Evans, 1982), (Forbes, 1990), (Perry, 1980), (Millikan, 1997), (Recanati, 2012), (Pryor, 2016), Geirs- 
son (n.d.) 
27 (Evans, 1982), (Forbes, 1990), (Recanati, 2012). 
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descriptive Fregeanism is non-explanatory). On the other hand, some bundle theorists take a 
leaf from the three-place relation theorist’s book and claim that differences in cognitive 
significance are psychological but not semantic. (Geirsson, n.d.), for example, holds that 
distinct names are psychologically associated with different webs of information and that 
utterances involving different names ‘elicit’ information from different webs. 
Finally we can mention a somewhat different kind of cognitive departure. The two 
approaches we have canvassed so far are alike in focusing on the nature of the attitudes. A 
different approach focuses on, what we can call, ‘evaluative heuristics’. According to this 
view, Frege-pairs differ in the way that they interact with the psychological mechanisms by 
which speakers evaluate utterances for truth/falsity28. Theorists who take this approach hold 
that Frege-pairs exploit a kind of systematic weakness in speakers’ ability to track utterance-
truth and a systematic reluctance to use known identities to make relevant inferences. This 
approach fits naturally with, though perhaps does not require commitment to, the relational 
accounts of cognitive architecture just mentioned. 
 
4.4 Semantic Departures 
It is often thought that Frege’s challenge requires us to depart from the default picture of the 
semantics of ascriptions. The most popular idea is to start from the ‘three-place’ relation 
approach to the attitudes. We can hold that ascriptions are semantically sensitive not only to 
which Russellian propositions an ascribee has attitudes towards, but also to how those attitudes 
are cognitively realized. Approaches differ with respect to how this cognitive structure is 
semantically encoded. They agree, though, that what particular cognitive information is 
encoded by the utterance of an ascription is dependent on context. 
On ‘hidden indexical’ approaches—(Schiffer, 1977, 1987, 1992),(Crimmins & Perry, 
1989)—utterances  of ⌜X v’s that p⌝ can  make reference either to a  particular mental symbol 
that carries (a part of) the content of p in a subject’s attitude state, or to a property of such 
symbols (perhaps the property of having a certain psychological or functional role). So the 
truth of an utterance of (2b) might require more than that Smith has a belief with the Russellian 
content that Dylan/Zimmerman is a musician. It might require also that this representation of 
Dylan/Zimmerman is carried by some particular one of Smith’s mental names for 
Dylan/Zimmerman, or by a symbol that is connected functionally to the name “Zimmerman”. 
 
28 (Braun, 1998; Braun & Saul, 2002; Saul, 2010) 
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Given that it isn’t plausible that reference to mental symbols, or their properties, is 
carried by any piece of the syntax of ascriptions, Crimmins & Perry hold that they are 
‘unarticulated constituents’ of the content of uttered ascriptions. It’s part of the meaning of 
ascriptions that utterances of them can be semantically filled-out in this way (as, perhaps, the 
meaning of “It’s raining” requires that the location of the putative rain be supplied by context). 
So although Frege-paired ascriptions, qua sentences, have the same linguistic meaning, 
utterances of them typically have different truth-conditions. For example, the use of “Dylan” 
rather than “Zimmerman” to report Smith’s belief will typically generate requirements on the 
properties of the mental symbol by which Smith grasps the relevant proposition. The story, 
though, about how context supplies information about mental symbols must be more 
complicated (it cannot simply appeal to the names used in the report). Our example of 
‘Paderewski’ above already shows that. 
Richard (1990) offers a different approach for semantically capturing the context-
sensitivity of ascriptions. He posits two ‘layers’ of meaning associated with p in ⌜X v’s that p⌝. 
This approach to ascriptions is structurally similar to the linguistically-enhanced approach to 
propositions canvassed above. The semantic contribution of p in an ascription is a complex 
consisting of Russellian content and the linguistic expressions that carry that content in the 
sentence (Richard calls these ‘RAMs’). Given the three-place relation approach to attitudes, we 
can think of a subject’s attitude state, itself, as a collection of relations to RAMs. The truth of 
an utterance of ⌜X v’s that p⌝ requires that the v-part of X ’s attitude state contains a RAM that 
stands in a contextually appropriate relation to the RAM expressed by p. 
An overarching worry for contextualist approaches to ascriptions is that we might lose 
the ability to capture cognitive relations between speakers, and systematic semantic relations 
between ascriptions. One danger for Richard’s view, for example, is that it makes the 
semantics of attitude ascriptions too fine-grained. Any difference in the expressions contained 
in p and pʹ will entail that they express different RAMs when embedded. It entails, for example, 
that (9a) and (9b) have distinct context-invariant meanings, given that their complement 
clauses express distinct RAMs (this example is from (Larson & Ludlow, 1993)). 
(9a) Galileo believed the Earth moved 
(9b) Galileo believed the Earth is non-stationary 
This is troubling insofar as it is natural to think that (9a) and (9b) make the same claim: 
it is hard to see how they could come apart in truth-value. Related worries arise for inferential 
relations between attitude ascription—(Richard, this volume)—and more generally for 
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psychological generalizations framed in terms of ascriptions (Goodman & Lederman, 2018). 
Contextualist theories must respond to these worries by characterizing restrictions, or 
systematic patterns, in the way that context determines the class of RAMs that are taken to be 
contextually similar to the RAM expressed by p in an utterance of ⌜X v’s that p⌝. 
Perhaps, for example, in any normal context, the RAMs expressed by the complements 
in (9a) and (9b) will count as similar enough that any subject whose attitude state contains a 
RAM that stands in the contextually appropriate relation to one will thereby contain a RAM 
that stands in the contextually appropriate relation to the other. This would explain why it is 
hard to imagine contexts in which the truth values of (9a) and (9b) might come apart. (To clean 
up a left-over strand from above, note that proponents of linguistically-enhanced propositions 
offer essentially the same response to corresponding worries about their approach). But as 
Goodman & Lederman (2018) show, it remains to be seen whether it’s possible to characterize 
contextual restrictions of this kind that capture all of the systematic relations between 
ascriptions that we might like.29 
One more potential worry. A common complaint—see, e.g.,(Schiffer, 1992), (Braun, 
1998), (Soames, 2002)—has been that it is implausible that ordinary speakers, when they utter 
ascriptions, are referring to, or more generally communicating about, the cognitive structures 
posited by three-place theories of attitudes. The worry is that this approach imputes more 
theoretical sophistication to ordinary speakers than is plausible. The question for contextualists 
is whether the folk-theoretical way that subjects keep track of other people’s psychological 
perspectives has enough determinacy to do the context-determining work that the theory 
requires of them. 
 
5 Interactions 
Space doesn’t allow us to evaluate the various strategies. But I will emphasize something that 
is, perhaps, already clear. Much of the work in unraveling the issues here comes in 
understanding the interaction between the different departures. We have seen this already in 
previous section. But I’ll offer a related impression: it seems unlikely that the full range of 
phenomena will be explained by any one approach. Recall, the challenge is quite open-ended: 
to explain how Frege-paired sentences can differ in relation to cognition. There is little reason 
to think that investigation will reveal that all such differences have exactly the same character, 
 
29 For related technical worries about approaches of this kind, see (Sider, 1995), (Soames, 1995). 
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and little reason to think that many differences will be explicable without appealing to the 
interaction between different departures from the default. 
To justify this impression, I’ll offer one more example. It’s plausible that at least part of 
the cognitive difference between Frege-pairs is pragmatic; we have general reasons to believe 
that, very often, the conveyed content of an utterance is distinct from the semantic content of 
the uttered sentence. And the determinants of conveyed content are many and varied, including 
subtle linguistic choices and rich psychological background information. So suppose we grant 
that in some context the conveyed content of an utterance of (3a) might include the Russellian 
proposition that Dylan/Zimmerman, the famous sixties folk icon, is a musician; while the 
conveyed content of an utterance of (3b) might include the Russellian proposition that 
Dylan/Zimmerman, the son of Abram Zimmerman from Duluth, is a musician. 
There is still the question: why do utterances of those different sentences have different 
conveyed contents? Abstracting away from the details of any particular explanation it’s 
unavoidable that we would need to appeal to some cognitive difference in the relation that 
agents stand in to the two sentences. But without departing from the default conception of 
semantics, propositions, or of cognitive structure, how could we capture any such difference? 
To see this, contrast two speech situations. On the one hand, we have Smith and Jones 
from above. Let’s stipulate that utterances of (3a) and (3b) would have the conveyed content 
just described. On other hand, consider Bizzaro-Smith and Bizzaro-Jones, whose cognitive 
relation to “Dylan” and “Zimmerman” means that the conveyed contents of (3a) and (3b) 
would be reversed compared to Smith and Jones’ context. The conveyed content of an 
utterance of (3a), for them, would include the Russellian proposition that Dylan/Zimmerman, 
the son of Abram Zimmerman from Duluth, is a musician. The conveyed content of (3b), for 
them, would include the Russellian proposition that Dylan/Zimmerman, the famous sixties folk 
icon, is a musician. How, without departing from default assumptions, can we understand the 
difference between Smith and Jones, on one hand, and Bizzaro-Smith and Bizzarro-Jones on 
the other? 
The details here will depend on what kind of pragmatic story one is telling. But any 
story will have to appeal to some difference like this: Smith believes that the name “Dylan” 
refers to a folk icon; she doesn’t believe that the name “Zimmerman” refers to folk icon, etc. 
Bizarro-Smith believes that “Zimmerman” refers to a folk icon; she doesn’t believe that 
“Dylan” refers to a folk icon, etc. Thus Smith and Bizarro-Smith believe different Russellian 
propositions. 
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But this is presumably not a brute fact about the psychology of Smith and Bizarro- 
Smith. It ought to be explained by something else. Focus on the following question: why is it 
that Smith believes that “Dylan” refers to a folk icon but Bizarro-Smith doesn’t believe that 
“Dylan” refers to a folk icon. Presumably this ought to be explained by a conjunction of 
linguistic knowledge and non-linguistic knowledge. We might point to the fact that Smith 
believes the Russellian propositions in (10a)-(10b). 
(10a) that “Dylan” refers to Dylan/Zimmerman 
(10b) that Dylan/Zimmerman is a folk icon 
This might seem promising. But note that Bizzaro-Smith also believes those Russellian 
propositions. She would express the (10b)-proposition differently than Smith would; she would 
express it by saying “Zimmerman is a folk icon”. But this is precisely what the default story 
cannot explain.30 Recall from above that if we all say about Smith’s attitude state is that it 
contains a beliefs with the Russellian contents in (10a)-(10b), we have said nothing that entails 
that Dylan is represented ‘as the same’ in those two attitudes. So we’ve said nothing that 
entails that Smith is in a position, for example, to infer from them that “Dylan” refers to a folk 
icon. So we can’t capture the difference between Smith and Jones’s context and Bizarro-Smith 
and Bizarro-Jones’s context that explains the difference in the conveyed content for utterances 
of (3a) and (3b). 
It seems, then, that any pragmatic story, presupposes either a propositional or cognitive 
departure from the default assumptions. And given that, we should examine the interaction 
between those two kinds of explanation, and the relative contribution of each to the various 
challenges posed by cognitive significance. 
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